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ABSTRACT  
The aim of this study is to analyse the short and long-term interactions between the natural gas markets in the context of Europe, Japan 
and the US that are the main constituents of natural gas consumption in the world and between the natural gas and oil markets. Within the 
framework of this study co-integration test is performed and the variable groups that have long-term relationships with each other are 
presented. Finally, the pairwise Granger causality test is performed in order to examine the short-term causality relationships and the 
results of uni-directional, bi-directional and non-casual relationships are found. 
 
Keywords: energy market, natural gas, liberalization, cointegration, causality 
JEL Classification: C10, F14, L95 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
There are many energy sources in the world, besides their allocation and consumption are not well matched 
with each other. While some of the energy sources are consumed where they are produced, some are being 
shipped to remote areas. Natural gas is believed to be the most important energy source in meeting the global 
energy demand for the near future. The shipment of gas is carried out by the liquefied natural gas (LNG) form 
at -260 degrees Fahrenheit through pipelines to a liquefaction facility, which is generally located next to a port 
or railhead. After the liquefaction process, LNG can be loaded to a ship or a railroad car and carried to the 
facility destination at which it will re-gasified and shipped to the required destination through pipelines. In 
other words, LNG provides the transportation of natural gas. Barnes and Bosworth (2015) questioned whether 
the integration of global natural markets has increased as the trade of LNG has increased because of the 
decreasing transportation costs. The authors found that the increase in LNG trade plays a significant role on the 
increase of the integration of global natural gas markets. With the usage of LNG, the restriction on the trade 
between global natural gas markets started to decrease. As a result it became very important to deliver 
transfer LNG to multiple countries in order to increase the natural gas integration. When compared with 
traditional compressed natural gas (CNG), LNG has multiple delivery points and provides flexibility in gas 
shipments. 
International Energy Agency points out that when compared with other energy sources, natural gas is friendlier 
with the environment, energy supply diversification is more efficient, and storage is easier and safer, cheaper 
and cleaner than gasoline and produces less greenhouse emissions.  There are three main regional gas markets; 
OECD Europe, North America and Japan/South Korea. The natural gas import trade among them is as follows: 
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Europe is mainly importing from Norway, Russia and Algeria, North America is mainly importing from Canada 
and Mexico and Japan/South Korea is mainly importing from Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia and the Middle 
East.  As the pipeline infrastructure and LNG shipment capacity are limited. In order to understand the dynamic 
interactions of natural gas prices in Europe, Japan and United States first of all the geographic, infrastructure 
and the market conditions of these three countries should be examined. The law of one price suggests that in a 
perfectly competitive market two identical goods should have the identical prices but the natural gas prices 
differ in the market. Natural gas prices can be affected due the specific supply and transportation costs, 
demand, weather and geographical conditions and diversification of import. Furthermore, because the supply 
of natural gas is limited with specific countries, a possibility of political risk may also affect the gas prices 
segmentation (Siliverstovs et al., 2005). 
To start with European natural gas market structure, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15411) all EU members beside Turkey, Norway, Switzerland  
and the non-EU Balkan states, in 2013 30% of the totally natural gas consumption 30% of it was supplied by 
Russia. In addition to Russia, the natural gas imported to Europe is provided by Central Asia, the Middle East 
and Africa. EIA estimates that in 2030 Europe will have a dependency of more than 80% on natural gas import 
as its own reserves have decreased. Algerian gas serves to southern Europe whereas Norway and Netherlands 
serve to northern. Russian gas dominates in Germany and Italy where there is no LNG capacity beside Spain is 
the one with the biggest LNG consumer in Europe. Depending on this information, it is clear that Europe gas 
import depends on non-European gas and the gas infrastructure is needed to be expanded by installing new 
pipelines and LNG facilitates (Renour-Maissant, 2012).  According to U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=JA), Japan is the world's largest LNG importer with 37% of global 
purchase since 2012 beside its natural gas pipeline transmission infrastructure is not enough to meet this 
demand. The geographical location in which it is surrounded by mountains which restricts the pipeline system 
and the past regulation system in which the government restricted the investment for the sector can be shown 
as the main reasons. Mainly after the Fukushima disaster, Japan has turned its way to LNG in order to 
compensate the lost nuclear energy generation. Furthermore, Japan considers about the environmental 
factors, as a result in the reduction of greenhouse emissions natural gas seems to be the cleanest fossil fuel for 
Japanese. The prices of Asian LNG that depend on global crude oil prices have increased as a result of high 
demand of Japanese natural gas especially after Fukushima and the high crude oil prices until the middle of 
2014. The recent decline in oil prices will seem to have a positive effect on Japanese revenues, which have 
been lower.  
Natural gas market of United States is a big market with high number of suppliers, production capability and 
pipeline network inside. Recently, unconventional gas started to take place in the market, which has three 
types; shale gas, coal seam gas and tight gas.  The major natural gas resources of the world are in the form of 
shale gas. The geographic distribution of shale gas is very important for the global energy sector. North 
America, South America, South Africa, Europe, Middle Asia and Arabia all have shale gas but for the United 
States shale gas seems to provide energy independency.  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Data 
and empirical methodology is given in the next section. Section 3 provides a summary statistics of the empirical 
findings. The paper ends with the conclusions and implications. 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This paper investigates the short and long-term interactions among European, Japan and the United States 
natural gas markets and between the natural gas and oil markets. The methodology part is based on the study 
of Siliverstovs et al. (2005). The data covers the period of February 2000 to December 2010, totally 131 
observations. For the empirical analysis, the data on energy prices are collected from the data book of Energy 
Prices and Taxes Statistics, which is published by International Energy Agency (IEA) in quarterly periods and the 
related databases are reached from OECD iLibrary (http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/).  These data are composed 
of average import prices within the context of Europe (Pipeline Gas and Liquefied Natural Gas/LNG), Japan 
(LNG) and the United States (Pipeline Gas and LNG), the average Henry Hub spot prices that reflect the natural 
gas spot prices along with Brent and West Texas Intermediate crude oil average spot prices that are taken as a 
benchmark for international oil prices.  
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First of all, in order to have compatibility among different prices, gas prices are converted into US$ per MBtu by 
IEA, using average conversion factors and oil prices are converted into US$/MBtu using the standard 
conversion factor (1bbl crude=5.46 MBtu). In the next step, unit root tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller, Phillips 
Peron and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin) are applied in order to examine the stability series. According to 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, the first difference of the variable is that it is regressed on its own delayed 
value and the delayed values of its first differences and hence it is tested whether ADF coefficient is zero or not 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979). Another unit root test made for the determination of stability is called Phillips-Perron 
(PP). The distribution theory on which Dickey-Fuller tests are based on assumes that the errors are statistically 
independent and have a fixed variance. Phillips-Perron (1988) approach allows loosening these assumptions 
relating to the distribution of errors (Enders, 1995). If the series of the variables are both integrated of the 
same order, the presence of a long-term relationship (co-integration vector) is investigated by using the co-
integration test developed by Johansen (1988; 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Co-integration implies 
that there is a causal relationship between the variables but it does not reveal the direction of it. In the case of 
detection of a relation of co-integration that indicates the existence of a long-term relation between the 
variables, relations of Granger (1969) causality must be analyzed. 
3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The results of ADF and PP unit root tests are presented in Appendix 1-2. The null hypothesis for the ADF and PP 
tests is that the variable has a unit root and is not stationary. All of the results indicate that the variables are 
non-stationary in level I (0), on the other hand the price series are stationary, I (1) when their first differences 
are taken. Findings of ADF unit root test are also supported by the findings of PP test. Once the unit root test 
results show that all variables are integrated at first level I (1), tests for co-integration can be applied.  
Appendix 3 reveals Johansen co-integration test results as determined by the Max-Eigenvalue and trace 
methods which examine the presence of a long-term co-integration relationship among European, Japan and 
the United States natural gas markets and between the natural gas and oil markets. The results display that 
there exists two-way co-integration vector between Henry Hub-Pipe US and Pipe Europe-Henry Hub whereas a 
single co-integration vector between Brent-LNG Europe, WTI oil-LNG Europe, WTI-Pipe Europe, Pipe US- LNG 
Europe, Pipe Europe-LNG Europe and Pipe Europe-Brent. There is no long-run relationship among other 
variables. Both the results of trace statistic and maximum eigenvalue support each other.  
These results reveal that there is regional gas market integration in United States as the null hypothesis of no 
co-integration between Henry Hub spot prices and pipeline gas import prices is rejected with 1% significance 
level supporting the results of De Vany and Walls (1993), Serletis and Herbert (1999) and Siliverstovs et al. 
(2005). Moreover, there is a regional market integration in Europe, as the null hypothesis of no co-integration 
between LNG Europe and Pipe Europe is rejected with 1% significance level supporting the results of Asche et 
al. (2011, 2002), Siliverstovs et al. (2005) and Renour-Maissant (2012). It is found that there is a strong 
evidence of co-integration between the price of Brent oil and each of the European gas prices and between the 
price of WTI oil and each of the European gas prices at 1% significance level. Differently from the results of 
Siliverstovs (2005) and the multidimensional scaling analysis, the null hypothesis of no co-integration between 
European and Japanese gas markets is not rejected. Having found evidence of a co-integrating relationship, this 
implies causality in at least one direction. This paper evaluates Granger causality through a pairwise Granger 
causality test as short-run causality. From Appendix 4, it is deduced that there is a bi-directional causality 
between the Henry Hub-Pipe US, LNG Japan-LNG Europe and LNG Japan-Brent oil. Moreover, there is a uni-
directional causality running from Henry Hub to LNG Europe, LNG Japan and Pipe Europe, from Brent oil to Pipe 
US, LNG Europe, LNG Japan and Pipe Europe, from WTI oil to LNG Europe, LNG Japan and Pipe Europe, from 
LNG Japan to Pipe US and Pipe Europe and lastly from Pipe US to Pipe Europe. There is no causal relationship 
between Brent-Henry Hub, WTI-Henry Hub and WTI-Pipe US. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This study analyzed the short and long-term interactions among the natural gas markets in the context of 
Europe, Japan and the United States that are the main constituents of natural gas consumption in the world 
and between the natural gas and oil markets covering the period from 2000.02 to 2010.12. The question of 
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whether natural gas markets are integrated with liberalization is  important for many researches as many 
industrialized countries are trying to liberalize their natural gas markets by giving permission to third party 
access to infrastructure, reducing trading barriers and introducing privatization in order to increase efficiency 
and decrease prices. Considering the findings, the results of this study demonstrate that the interaction of 
natural gas markets within the inter-continental area is limited, whereas the natural gas markets of continental 
countries are liberalized that is consistent with the results of De Vany and Walls (1993), Serletis and Herbert 
(1999) for North America, Asche et al. (2011, 2002), and Renour-Maissant (2012) for Europe. Moreover, the 
study of Siliverstovs et al. (2005) is the first that regards the degree of natural gas market integration 
internationally and the findings of this study support them. 
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Appendix 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variable ADF (Level) ADF (First Difference) 
Constant Constant-Trend Constant Constant-Trend 
LN(BRENT) -1.207 [1] 
(0.669) 
-2.789 [1] 
(0.203) 
-9.641 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
-9.606 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(WTI) -1.309[1] 
(0.623) 
-2.884 [1] 
(0.171) 
-8.669 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
-8.637 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(HENRY HUB) -2.506 [0] 
(0.116) 
-2.320 [0] 
(0.419) 
-10.613 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
-10.632 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(PIPE EUROPE) -1.464 [3] 
(0.548) 
-2.647 [3] 
(0.260) 
-4.285 [2]*** 
(0.0007) 
-4.286 [2]*** 
(0.0045) 
LN(LNG EUROPE) -1.481 [0] 
(0.539) 
-2.012 [0] 
(0.588) 
-9.834 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
-9.805 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(PIPE US) -2.599 [0]* 
(0.095) 
-2.453 [0] 
(0.359) 
-9.832 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
-9.840 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(LNG US) -2.182 [0] 
(0.213) 
-2.133 [0] 
(0.522) 
-10.433 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
-10.448 [0]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(LNG JAPAN) -1.041 [2] 
(0.737) 
-3.588 [2]** 
(0.034) 
-4.820 [1]*** 
(0.0001) 
-4.822 [1]*** 
(0.0007) 
Critical Value 1% -3.481 -4.030 -3.481 -4.030 
Critical Value 5% -2.883 -3.445 -2.883 -3.445 
Critical Value 10% -2.578 -3.147 -2.578 -3.147 
Notes: MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. The optimal lag-length for the test was selected by Schwarz Information Criterion. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
Appendix 2: Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Test Results 
 
Variable PP (Level) PP (First Difference) 
Constant Constant-Trend Constant Constant-Trend 
LN(BRENT) -1,115 [2] 
(0.708) 
-2.770 [3] 
(0.210) 
-9.635 [1]*** 
(0.000) 
-9.600 [1]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(WTI) -1.272 [3] 
(0.641) 
-2.780 [4] 
(0.207) 
-8.701 [2]*** 
(0.000) 
-8.670 [2]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(HENRY HUB) -2.752 [5]* 
(0.068) 
-2.604 [5] 
(0.279) 
-10.635 [4]*** 
(0.000) 
-10.650 [4]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(PIPE EUROPE) -1.556 [6] 
(0.501) 
-2.083 [6] 
(0.549) 
-10.682 [6]*** 
(0.000) 
-10.711 [6]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(LNG EUROPE) -1.612 [5] 
(0.473) 
-2.543 [6] 
(0.307) 
-9.964 [4]*** 
(0.000) 
-9.939 [4]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(PIPE US) -2.846 [5]* 
(0.054) 
-2.734 [5] 
(0.224) 
-9.786 [3]*** 
(0.000) 
-9.790 [3]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(LNG US) -2.268 [1] 
(0.183) 
-2.256 [1] 
(0.454) 
-10.412 [3]*** 
(0.000) 
-10.422 [4]*** 
(0.000) 
LN(LNG JAPAN) -0.905 [7] 
(0.783) 
-2.573 [7] 
(0.293) 
-8.282 [6]*** 
(0.000) 
-8.258 [6]*** 
(0.000) 
Critical Value 1% -3.481 -4.030 -3.481 -4.030 
Critical Value 5% -2.883 -3.444 -2.883 -3.445 
Critical Value 10% -2.578 -3.147 -2.578 -3.147 
Notes: MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. The optimal lag-length for the test was selected by Newey-West using Bartlett Kernel . *** 
and * denote statistical significance at 1% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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Appendix 3: Johansen Co-Integration Test Results 
 
Variables Hypothesis Eigenvalue TraceStatistic Prob. 
Max-
EigenStatistic 
Prob. 
Henry Hub 
Pipe US [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.222 
0.051 
38.313*** 
6.628*** 
0.000 
0.0010 
31.684*** 
6.628*** 
0.000 
0.0010 
Henry Hub 
LNG Europe [1] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.074 
0.025 
13.239 
3.306 
0.106 
0.069 
9.932 
3.306 
0.216 
0.069 
Henry Hub 
Brent [1] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.058 
0.008 
8.899 
1.127 
0.374 
0.288 
7.772 
1.127 
0.402 
0.288 
Brent 
Pipe US [2] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.066 
0.014 
10.690 
1.916 
0.231 
0.166 
8.773 
1.916 
0.305 
0.166 
Brent 
LNG Europe [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.349 
0.006 
55.020*** 
0.793 
0.000 
0.373 
54.227*** 
0.793 
0.000 
0.373 
Brent 
LNG Japan [7] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.038 
0.003 
5.344 
0.471 
0.771 
0.492 
4.873 
0.471 
0.757 
0.492 
WTI 
Henry Hub [2] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.057 
0.017 
9.809 
2.197 
0.295 
0.138 
7.611 
2.197 
0.419 
0.138 
WTI 
Pipe US [2] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.066 
0.020 
11.413 
2.658 
0.187 
0.103 
8.755 
2.658 
0.307 
0.103 
WTI 
LNG Europe [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.305 
0.006 
46.870*** 
0.852 
0.000 
0.355 
46.017*** 
0.852 
0.000 
0.355 
WTI 
LNG Japan [7] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.042 
0.003 
5.712 
0.393 
0.729 
0.530 
5.318 
0.393 
0.701 
0.530 
WTI 
Pipe Europe [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.227 
0.008 
33.616*** 
1.036 
0.000 
0.308 
32.580*** 
1.036 
0.000 
0.308 
LNG Japan 
Henry Hub [6] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.080 
8.71E-05 
10.411 
0.010 
0.250 
0.917 
10.401 
0.010 
0.186 
0.917 
LNG Japan 
Pipe US [6] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.086 
5.54E-05 
11.181 
0.006 
0.200 
0.933 
11.175 
0.006 
0.145 
0.933 
LNG Japan 
LNG Europe [6] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.047 
0.005 
6.832 
0.737 
0.597 
0.390 
6.095 
0.737 
0.601 
0.390 
LNG Japan 
WTI [7] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.042 
0.003 
5.712 
0.393 
0.729 
0.530 
5.318 
0.393 
0.701 
0.530 
Pipe US 
LNG Europe [1] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.092 
0.019 
15.036* 
2.565 
0.058 
0.109 
12.470* 
2.565 
0.094 
0.109 
Pipe Europe 
Henry Hub [1] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.112 
0.028 
19.117** 
3.685* 
0.013 
0.054 
15.432** 
3.685* 
0.032 
0.054 
Pipe Europe 
Pipe US [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.088 
0.012 
13.257 
1.589 
0.105 
0.207 
11.668 
1.589 
0.123 
0.207 
Pipe Europe 
LNG Europe [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.169 
0.013 
25.028*** 
1.669 
0.0014 
0.196 
23.359*** 
1.669 
0.0014 
0.196 
Pipe Europe 
Brent [4] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.246 
0.007 
36.710*** 
0.972 
0.000 
0.324 
35.737*** 
0.972 
0.000 
0.324 
Pipe Europe 
LNG Japan [3] 
H0: r=0 
H0: r≤1 
0.055 
0.031 
11.327 
4.043 
0.192 
0.044 
7.283 
4.043 
0.456 
0.044 
Notes: MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values [ ] Lag Length. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. 
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Appendix 4: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Results 
 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. Lags Causal Relation 
PGUS does not granger cause HENRY HUB (HH) 
HENRY HUB does not granger cause PGUS 
3.536*** 
41.341*** 
0.009 
1E-21 
4 HH↔PGUS 
LNGEUR does not granger cause HENRY HUB 
HENRY HUB does not granger cause LNGEUR 
0.875 
9.174*** 
0.351 
0.003 
1 HH→LNGEUR 
BRENT does not granger cause HENRY HUB 
HENRY HUB does not granger cause BRENT 
0.831 
0.266 
0.363 
0.606 
1 No causal relation 
PGUS does not granger cause BRENT 
BRENT does not granger cause PGUS 
0.332 
2.449* 
0.718 
0.090 
2 BRENT→PGUS 
LNGEUR does not granger cause BRENT 
BRENT does not granger cause LNGEUR 
1.537 
21.777*** 
0.195 
2E-13 
4 BRENT→LNGEUR 
LNGJAP does not granger cause BRENT 
BRENT does not granger cause LNGJAP 
0.713 
14.801*** 
0.660 
2E-13 
7 BRENT→LNGJAP 
HENRY HUB does not granger cause WTI 
WTI does not granger cause HENRY HUB 
0.178 
0.816 
0.837 
0.444 
2 No causal relation 
PGUS does not granger cause WTI 
WTI does not granger cause PGUS 
0.379 
3.312 
0.684 
0.039 
2 No causal relation 
LNGEUR does not granger cause WTI 
WTI does not granger cause LNGEUR 
1.901 
19.624*** 
0.114 
2E-12 
4 WTI→LNGEUR 
LNGJAP does not granger cause WTI 
WTI does not granger cause LNGJAP 
0.717 
15.814*** 
0.657 
3E-14 
7 WTI→LNGJAP 
PGEUR does not granger cause WTI 
WTI does not granger cause PGEUR 
1.123 
11.472*** 
0.348 
7E-08 
4 WTI→PGEUR 
LNGJAP does not granger cause HENRY HUB 
HENRY HUB does not granger cause LNGJAP 
1.611 
2.583** 
0.150 
0.022 
6 HH→LNGJAP 
PGUS does not granger cause LNGJAP 
LNGJAP does not granger cause PGUS 
1.599 
2.571** 
0.153 
0.022 
6 LNGJAP→PGUS 
LNGEUR does not granger cause LNGJAP 
LNGJAP does not granger cause LNGEUR 
3.135*** 
9.102*** 
0.007 
4E-08 
6 LNGJAP↔LNGEUR 
WTI does not granger cause LNGJAP 
LNGJAP does not granger cause WTI 
15.814*** 
0.717* 
3E-14 
0.717 
7 WTI→LNGJAP 
LNGJAP does not granger cause BRENT 
BRENT does not granger cause LNGJAP 
0.276 
3.968** 
0.599 
0.048 
1 BRENT→LNGJAP 
HENRY HUB does not granger cause PGEUR 
PGEUR does not granger cause HENRY HUB 
11.677*** 
0.379 
0.0009 
0.539 
1 HH→PGEUR 
PGUS does not granger cause PGEUR 
PGEUR does not granger cause PGUS 
2.444* 
1.186 
0.0503 
0.320 
4 PGUS→PGEUR 
LNGEUR does not granger cause PGEUR 
PGEUR does not granger cause LNGEUR 
5.340*** 
6.416*** 
0.0005 
0.0001 
4 LNGJAP↔BRENT 
BRENT does not granger cause PGEUR 
PGEUR does not granger cause BRENT 
12.087*** 
1.031 
3E-08 
0.394 
4 BRENT→PGEUR 
PGEUR does not granger cause LNGJAP 
LNGJAP does not granger cause PGEUR 
1.661 
4.747*** 
0.179 
0.003 
3 LNGJAP→PGEUR 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.  
